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The author of this synthesis is the German historian of Croatian origin Marie-Janine Calic, daughter of the historian and writer Eduard Calic. 
Prior to her current position as professor of history at Ludwig Maximilian 
University in Munich, she was a researcher at the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs in Ebenhausen and Berlin (1992–2004). 
She also served as political advisor to the UN Special Representative for the 
former Yugoslavia in Zagreb (1995) and to the Special Coordinator of the 
Pact for the Stability of South-East Europe Bodo Hombach in Brussels 
(1999–2002). Calic also served as expert/consultant of the ICTY in The 
Hague. She is already known to Serbian readership by her book Social his-
tory of Serbia 1815–1941. Sluggish progress in industrialisation (2004) derived 
from her doctoral thesis.
Calic’s book on the history of Yugoslavia, prefaced by Ulrich Herbert 
and the author, is divided into six parts (The South Slavic movement and 
the establishment of the state 1878–1918; The First Yugoslavia 1918–1941; 
The Second World War 1941–1945; Socialist Yugoslavia 1945–1980; After 
Tito 1980–1991; The Decline, since 1991) and ends with a conclusion and 
an appendix which contains abbreviations, tables, maps, information about 
political parties and coalitions, timeline and bibliography. The afterword 
for the Serbian edition in an unmerited complimentary tone is written by 
Ranka Gašić, the book’s co-translator with Vladimir Babić.
The reasons for the creation, preservation and violent demise of 
the Yugoslav state are summed up into four rhetorical questions of which 
two, “Did people simply become victims of nationalist manipulation?” and 
“Was its violent collapse inevitable?”, give a hint of Calic’s line of thinking. 
* milos.j.misic@gmail.com
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She emphasises that her book is not primarily concerned with structures 
of longue durée or “distinctive roads” in the Balkans but rather with the 
dynamic of overall changes, interconnections and interactions, general “fea-
tures and parallels”, and that its “most important question” is how “develop-
ment and progress were conceived of in different times and what means 
were used to achieve them” (pp. 13–15).1 The author’s attachment to “mod-
ernisation” theory, to a narrowed view of history as continuous advancement 
seems to be unquestionable.
Calic believes that her “approach to the problem distances the book 
away from popular interpretations of the Yugoslav problem, while drawing 
to the foreground structural factors, such as ethnocultural oppositions and 
civilisational incongruities”, and proceeds to put forward her central thesis 
that “what undermined the project of Yugoslav union was not the well-
known Balkan intolerance or perpetual hatred between peoples” but “the 
politicisation of differences in modern twentieth-century mass society”. The 
central question of the book as defined by its author is “who, why, under 
what circumstances and how turned ethnic identity and diversity into an 
object of dispute”, and offers the answer straightaway: it was all about “the 
actors’ interests, worldviews and motives, socio-economic processes as well 
as cultural-historical dimensions of collective experiences, memories and 
interpretations of history” (p. 15).
A look at the contents of the book itself reveals a certain imbalance. 
If we take it as somewhat understandable that the period preceding the 
creation of Yugoslavia, 1878–1918, is given 78 pages, the criterion remains 
vague for devoting as few as 64 pages to the first Yugoslav state, and as two 
and a half as many, 166, to communist Yugoslavia, 1945–1991. On the other 
hand, the author puts much effort into making the book appear balanced by 
seeking to distribute her attention evenly among, and by taking a generally 
positive attitude towards, all Yugoslav peoples, including those that are not 
South Slavs (Albanians). There is also a tendency to compare phenomena 
and processes, which may be a very useful method in principle; but in her 
effort to be balanced, Calic not infrequently goes too far in that she con-
structs balance where there can be none, which results in “false equivalence” 
or “ethnic symmetry”, and compares incomparable phenomena and pro-
cesses. By doing so, she “equates” them, i.e. places them symbolically on the 
same plane. Those who do not know much about the history of Yugoslavia 
may find the book quite balanced and impartial all through until the penul-
timate chapter which is devoted to the disintegration of the country and the 
wars of its succession and which uncritically retells the “politically correct” 
narrative of the ICTY.
1 All bracketed pages in the text refer to the Serbian edition of the book.
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The book is marked by inconsistency, selectiveness, contradiction, 
major factual oversights, confusion in some interpretations, even anachro-
nisms. In the second subchapter, “Peoples, nations, identities”, Calic argues 
that “there was no Yugoslav nation at the turn of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries or a clear notion of what it meant to call oneself a ‘Slovene’, 
a ‘Croat’ or a ‘Serb’”, that “none of the subsequent constituent peoples of 
Yugoslavia had made up one integrated community” and that “the notion of 
the transhistorical existence of a people which may be objectivised by means 
of language, culture, religion or origin has remained widespread till this day, 
but historically the idea is completely erroneous” (pp. 26–27). “To put it 
more simply,” she concludes, “around 1900 the lands of subsequent Yugo-
slavia were mostly inhabited by South Slavs who were related by linguistic-
cultural kinship” (p. 27). 
If we assume for a moment that all the above is basically true and that 
the conclusion is value-neutral in principle, then it is completely unclear 
why Calic previously, on her “imaginary journey through the South Slavic 
lands around 1900”, explicitly names “Slovenes”, who lived in a “mixed com-
munity with Germans, Italians, Croats and others”, and “Croats”, who lived 
in their historical provinces and in “Bosnia and Herzegovina and south-
ern Hungary” (pp. 22–23), while mentioning, on the same page, in refer-
ence to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, “South Slavs of Orthodox, 
Muslim and Catholic faiths” even though the Serbs in Bosnia, evasively 
called “Orthodox Slavs”, had, according to most contemporary domestic 
and foreign sources, a clearly defined national consciousness (p. 23). Simi-
lar inconsistency occurs on the next page in connection with Montenegro, 
where despite its incontestable Serbian identity she claims lived “Orthodox 
Slavs” and a few thousand Turks, Albanians and Slavs of Muslim faith” (p. 
24). For the vilayet of Kosovo (Stara Srbija/Old Serbia), she claims that 
“its more than 1.6 million inhabitants made up an ethnic and confessional 
hotchpotch”,2 while in Serbia lived Serbs who also lived in the Habsburg 
Monarchy3 (pp. 25–26). Similar confusion can be found later in the book, 
for example, with reference to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia 
2 Calic also claims that the population was half Christian and half Muslim, which is not 
true. For precise data that indicate a Muslim majority see M. Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski 
odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912) (Belgrade 2009), 252–256 and 260–262.
3 The insignificant anachronism set aside – from the 1867 Compromise the Habsburg 
Monarchy was called Austria-Hungary – Calic offers inaccurate data on the population 
of present-day Vojvodina, relying on the pro-Croat historian Jozo Tomasevich, namely 
that of 1.3 million inhabitants Magyars accounted for 32%, Serbs for 29%, Germans 
for 23% etc. Calic is obviously unaware of the Austro-Hungarian census of 1900 which 
shows a population of about 1.43 million, of whom 33.7% Serbs, 26% Magyars, 23.5% 
Germans etc. For more detail see D. Djordjević, “Die Serben”, in Die Habsburgermon-
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and Herzegovina in 1878: to the “South Slavs” already living in Austria-
Hungary now “joined nearly two million Serbs,4 Bosniaks and Croats” (p. 
56), and then, two pages later, we reencounter “Muslims” and “Orthodox 
and Catholic Christians” (p. 58). It is a mystery why she clearly identifies 
inhabitants of some Yugoslav areas (Slovenes, Germans, Italians, even Al-
banians and Turks) while subsuming others under more general categories 
(Slavs). In point of fact, the lack of clear-cut criteria is one of the major 
scholarly shortcomings of this book. 
This as well as arbitrariness can best be seen in the case of the popula-
tion of Montenegro. Calic unenthusiastically admits that “many Montene-
grins considered themselves as being Serbs” because of the “association of 
Orthodox with ‘Serbian’, which in many areas continued into the 1930s” (p. 
29), but she still insists that “a part of Montenegrins saw themselves as a 
distinctive people” (p. 59) and that “while supporters of the Popular Move-
ment saw Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and advocated the unification of 
‘two Serbian states’, the monarch and the government insisted on separate 
historical-political identities” (p. 75).5
The Illyrian movement is presented as both Croatian and Yugoslav 
“given that it was open and inclusive” and that “it did not function only as 
Croatian national ideology but also opened a transcendental space to all 
South-Slavic peoples” (p. 54). However, an important component of the 
“Illyrian idea” is omitted: having been rejected by almost all Slovenes and 
Serbs in the 1830s, it came to be used as an exclusive model for the integra-
tion of Štokavian-speaking Catholics into the Croat nation in the following 
decades and in a large area considered as “Illyrian”. The author also seems to 
be unaware that the Habsburg Monarchy called Serbs an “Illyrian nation” 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, finally abandoning the appel-
lation after 1804.6
archie 1848–1918, vol. III (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaft, 1980), 734–774.
4 The first census of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out by Austro-Hungarian authori-
ties in 1879 shows a figure of about 1.15 million people. Cf. Dj. Pejanović, Stanovništvo 
Bosne i Hercegovine (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1955).
5 Calic either does not know or chooses to ignore the fact that throughout the nine-
teenth century and even before there was in Montenegro a strong, almost zealous sense 
of Serbian identity, a sense shared by Prince (from 1910 King) Nikola Petrović Njegoš 
himself. It is unscholarly to speak of Montenegrin identity – invented in the 1930s as 
part of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s policy against “greater-Serbian hegemony” and 
introduced by decree in 1945 – in the period of the past the author refers to.  
6 There were at the court in Vienna the Illyrian Court Deputation and the Illyrian Court 
Chancellery responsible for all Serbs of the Monarchy. Cf. V. Gavrilović, Temišvarski sa-
bor i Ilirska dvorska kancelarija (1790–1792) (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2005).
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The South Slav idea, derived from Illyrianism in the 1860s, is associ-
ated with “enlightened elites who believed in progress”, i.e. with “the liberal 
middle classes, the intelligentsia and the Catholic clergy”7 headed by J. J. 
Strossmayer who “led the opposition to Austrian centralism” (p. 55). On 
the other side of the spectrum was, “as a rival”, the Croatian Party of Rights 
led by Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik with its “irredentist and hege-
monist nationalism” which “denied individuality to the other South-Slavic 
peoples” (pp. 55–56). Calic fails to mention that Strossmayer’s vision of the 
South Slav idea involved proselytic intentions (to bring the Orthodox Serbs 
to a union with Rome), which is to say, he did envisage a South Slav state 
but Catholic, with its seat in Zagreb and within Austria-Hungary.8
If Calic on the whole overestimates the strength of the South Slavic 
movement, she does not do so with Ilija Garašanin’s “Načertanije”, the first 
Serbian foreign policy programme drafted in 1844, “whose thought deci-
sively influenced the Serbian national programme” until 1914. Yet, some-
thing of an exaggeration is her claim that with it began the “shaping of the 
mental map of a future (greater)Serbian state” (p. 60), borrowed from Holm 
Sundhaussen’s stereotypical, one-sided interpretation. The concept of men-
tal map seems to imply that the entire Serbian society was imbued with the 
ideas contained in the “Načertanije”, while it in fact was a secret document 
only known to few Serbian politicians, a document inclusive in nature (the 
unification of Serbs in Turkey in Europe as the first phase towards a broader 
union, which would not become possible until twenty years later) and, fi-
nally, a document which did not become known to the public until the be-
ginning of the twentieth century.9 The very active role of the Polish emigra-
tion headed by Count Adam Czartoryski in drawing up the “Načertanije” 
is presented as passive, while the fact remains unrevealed that a “draft” for 
Garašanin’s “Načertanije” was the work of a Polish agent of Czech origin, 
F. Zach.10 Finally, Calic offers a fairly one-sided assessment of Serbian na-
7 An interesting observation on Yugoslavism is offered by the British historian A. J. P. 
Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Aus-
tria-Hungary (London 1976 [1941]: “The ‘South Slav’ idea was an intellectual creation, 
not the outcome of national development” (p. 190), and “The South Slav idea, synthetic 
and intellectual, won only the educated middle class which looked at Strosmajer’s col-
lection of pictures; mass nationalism, in Croatia as everywhere else, sprang from the soil 
and hated its nearest neighbours” (p. 223).
8 V. Krestić, Biskup Štrosmajer u svetlu novih izvora (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2002), as well 
as his Biskup Štrosmajer: Hrvat, velikohrvat ili Jugosloven ( Jagodina: Gambit, 2006) and 
Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1848–1914 (Belgrade: Politika & SANU, 1991).
9 R. Ljušić, Srpska državnost 19. veka (Belgrade: SKZ, 2008), 140. 
10 Ibid. 133.
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tionalism. She claims that it had a “tendency to marked self-awareness, ir-
redentism and expansionism” – as if a movement for national liberation in 
the nineteenth century had been a bad thing and not a legitimate European 
model for unification which had given rise to Germany and Italy – and then 
softens the statement by allowing that one should “not necessarily infer 
some greater Serbian mania for conquest from that” (p. 60). Summing up 
the national programmes, Calic insists that “different national ideologies 
perhaps contributed more to differences between peoples than religious and 
linguistic differences”, but admits that Croats and Slovenes were “more dis-
posed to a compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy” which would have 
involved a “federal reorganisation of the existing Habsburg system” given 
that “the Habsburgs, after all, imposed their rule through a contractual rela-
tionship (Pacta Conventa) and not through military subjugation”,11 and that 
“the Catholic faith was a bridge between rulers and subjects”. The renowned 
Croatian historian Nada Klaić demonstrated as early as fifty years ago that 
the Pacta Conventa (1102) is a later forgery, that there was no contractual re-
lationship between Croatia and Hungary or Austria but only classical con-
quest, which means that there was no legal continuity.12 On the other hand, 
“opposite Catholic universalist state-building thought which invoked legal 
state continuity and the idea of a stable historical territory was more ex-
pansive Serbian cultural nationalism whose starting point was independent 
Serbia and its Serbian-Orthodox state church” (p. 64). If this is so, and it is, 
it is not clear why Calic chooses not to follow her own line of argument any 
further and infer that religious and linguistic differences, as a phenomenon 
of longue durée, determined some elements of the national ideologies.
Basic oversights can be found in the account of the Ilinden Uprising 
as well, where Calic attributes a Macedonian national character and the 
slogan “Macedonia to Macedonians” to the Internal Macedonian Revo-
lutionary Organisation (IMRO) (p. 64) even though the organisation’s 
Bulgarian orientation is obvious from its very constitution.13 While men-
tioning the mass demonstrations against Ban Khuen-Hédérvary in Zagreb 
and other parts of Croatia in 1903 and interpreting them as a sign that the 
Croats abandoned their loyalty to Austria-Hungary, Calic fails to men-
11 The author seems to lose sight of all Austro-Ottoman wars waged from the end of the 
seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, notably the War of the Holy League 
1683–1699 and the Napoleonic Wars that ended in 1815. In those wars the Habsburg 
Monarchy could hardly enlarge its territory by means of some willingly established 
“contractual relationships”.
12 N. Klaić, “O jednoj ‘naučnoj diskusiji’”, Historijski zbornik 14 (Zagreb 1961), 259–267.
13 For more see J. M. Jovanović, Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja (Bel-
grade: Geca Kon, 1941). 
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tion major anti-Serbian demonstrations in Zagreb in 1902 (not to men-
tion those lesser in 1899 and 1901) combined with ethnically motivated 
persecution and property destruction.14 Even though she speaks of politi-
cal cooperation of Serbs and Croats through the Croat-Serbian Coalition 
in 1903–1905 as a strategic rather than a tactical cooperation forced by 
Austro-Hungarian growing repression (pp. 66–68), Calic admits that in 
ethnically mixed environments the public, the press, the cultural, political 
and sports associations, even savings bank were “increasingly divided along 
national lines” and that “with the exception of the Socialists and the youth 
movement there were virtually no supra-ethnic or supra-religious political 
organisations” (pp. 70–71).
Succumbing to the new, pro-Ottoman trend in interpreting the Bal-
kan Wars in European and other historiographies, Calic claims that the 
armies of the Balkan states advancing into Ottoman territory “committed 
appalling atrocities against civilian population” and that “deportation, expul-
sion and partial destruction of undesirable minorities was common practice 
aimed at justifying territorial aspirations which were no longer legitimate”. 
To illustrate her claim, she chooses to speak of Serbs alone, and invoking 
the second-hand information Leon Trotsky gathered while sitting safely 
in a Belgrade hotel: so Serbs, she quotes the pro-Albanian lobbyist Noel 
Malcolm, “in order to correct ethnographic statistics in their favour, ‘simply 
engage in the systematic destruction of Muslim population’”, and then “bal-
ances” the claim by stating that the armies of the other Balkan states, which 
for some reason remain unnamed, carried out ethnic cleansing; their motive, 
however, was to “stifle resistance”. The paragraph ends with the detailed 
description of crimes against Albanians put together by “an independent 
international committee of inquiry” (p. 82), the very same committee, by the 
way, that the British expert R. Seton-Watson described as an instrument of 
Bulgarian propaganda.
The review of the context that led to the Balkan Wars leaves out the 
persecution of Serbs prior to 1912, especially in the vilayet of Kosovo in 
1878–1912 when Muslim Albanians played the role as “bulwark” of the 
Ottoman Empire against Christian states, which was a good enough reason 
to turn a blind eye to their abuse and violence against Serbs and other non-
Muslims and non-Albanians. Left out is also the fact that official Serbia 
took diplomatic action with the Sublime Porte in a bid to stop Albanian 
violence in the vilayet of Kosovo and that in 1899 it published a bilin-
gual “blue book on Albanian acts of violence” which was to be submitted 
14 Krestić, Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj, 352–353.
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to the international peace conference at The Hague.15 The consequence of 
those acts of violence was ethnic cleansing indeed but of 135,000 Serbs 
and other Orthodox Christians, of whom 100,000 fled the area north of 
the Šar Mountain (present-day Kosovo and Raška) and 35,000 the areas 
south of it.16 All of that was part of the policy of systematic expulsion with 
a view to weakening the claims of Serbia and Montenegro, as well of other 
Balkan states, on Ottoman-held territory. Despite all that, which Calic does 
not seem to know, on the eve of the war the Serbian government issued a 
proclamation which guaranteed property, religious, personal and linguistic 
rights to Albanians and stated that “all that came to pass between Serbs and 
Albanians is now committed to forgiveness and oblivion”.17 
Calic is relatively objective in writing about the Sarajevo assassina-
tion, the July crisis and the outbreak of the First World War. The assas-
sination is described neither as the cause of the war nor as organised by 
the Serbian government nor as predominantly orchestrated from Serbia. 
She believes that the conspirators “acted upon their own initiative, but with 
support from the Serbian military secret service and the organisation Black 
Hand”. She does not mention the indiscriminate destructive anti-Serbian 
demonstrations in the aftermath of the assassination, to which the authori-
ties turned a blind eye, or murders, hangings, deportations to camps, high 
treason trials and various other forms of discrimination against the Serbs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 She discusses the drawing up of the ultimatum 
to Serbia and Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic preparation for war, defining 
very precisely that “the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne on 28 June 1914 was only a trigger for the military explosion of in-
ternational power competition which had been exacerbating for years”, and 
that “emperor Franz Josef would have never attacked Serbia without ‘back-
covering’ and encouragement from Germany” (p. 86).
15 Documents diplomatiques concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais 
dans la Vielle-Serbie (vilayet of Kosovo) 1898–1899 (Belgrade: Ministère des Affaires 
étrangères, 1899); see also Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu, 183–222, 
with a detailed list of recorded crimes on p. 205.
16 Ibid. 366. Detailed documentation in Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890–1900, 
ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985); Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901–1913, 
ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1988); Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vila-
jetu 1878–1912, ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Nova, 1989). Additional documents about 
crimes of Albanian outlaws against Serbs in the late eighteenth and early twentieth 
century in Zadužbine Kosova (Prizren and Belgrade 1987). 
17 Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu, 361.
18 In detail in V. Ćorović, Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svetskog 
rata 1914–1918 (Sarajevo: B. Djurdjević, 1910).
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Writing about Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia in the autumn 
of 1914, Calic remarks that Croats, Slovenes and Serbs “had to fight” in 
its army, and that they “accounted for up to 40% of some units” (p. 87). 
Her probably inadvertent oversight set aside – namely, members of these 
peoples, notably Croats, accounted for more than 50% of the army that 
invaded Serbia in the autumn of 1914,19 and 11% of the entire army on all 
fronts20 – the remark that they had been coerced into fighting does not hold 
water. As observed by A. J. P. Taylor: “The Croat masses ‘voted by their feet’ 
by marching enthusiastically against Serbia.”21
If Calic does not try to downplay crimes committed by Austro-Hun-
garian troops (pp. 88–89) or systematic pillage, persecution and discrimina-
tion under the occupation regime in 1915–1918 (pp. 91–92), she implies 
an equivalence between the “ruthless policy of bulgarisation, occupation 
and economic exploitation” in the Bulgarian zone of occupation in 1915–
1918 and the policy allegedly pursued by Belgrade in the “areas acquired in 
1912/3” which she describes as “merciless ‘serbianisation’” (p. 91), however 
unfeasible it was within less than two years of Serbia’s effective control over 
the New Areas of Serbia.
Speaking about the creation of the state, Calic offers a detailed ac-
count of the activities of the Serbian government but fails, for some impen-
etrable reasons, to mention the 1914 Niš Declaration, an intellectual such 
as Jovan Cvijić, the Croat and Serb politicians assembled in the Yugoslav 
Committee and the 1917 Corfu Declaration. She overrates the extent of 
acceptance of the Yugoslav idea in Slovenia and Croatia “where only some 
sections of the Catholic clergy were against” and unnecessarily introduces 
the question of self-determination in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mace-
donia (pp. 97–98). In 1918 Serbian Macedonia was an ethnic mix-up (of 
Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs, Greeks, Macedonian Slavs), while 42 
of 54 counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina had voted for immediate and un-
conditional unification with the Kingdom of Serbia by 3 December 1918 
when the voting process was ceased because it was learnt that unification 
had been proclaimed in Belgrade two days earlier. The reader learns noth-
ing about Stjepan Radić’s statement of 1914 that the Serbs are an “unscru-
pulous enemy of the August [Habsburg] dynasty, of our Monarchy, and 
especially of the Croat way of life”22 or of Antun Korošec’s, relating to the 
19 M. Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje izmedju klanja i ranja. Istorija Srba u novom veku (1492–
1992) (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 354; A. Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom 
ratu (Belgrade: SKZ, 1984), 100–108. 
20 P. Tomac, Prvi svetski rat 1914–1918 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1973), 53.
21 Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 238.
22 Ibid.
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May Declaration of 1917 – which the author believes had an “elating effect 
on the South Slaves” (p. 96) – that “our Croat-Slovene people is firmly and 
entirely resolved to be true and loyal, to the death, to the monarchy and the 
August ruling house of Habsburg”.23 
Describing the end of the First World War Calic quotes an interesting 
if quite ambiguous remark of Miroslav Krleža: “...when our Austro-Magyar 
reality drunkenly rolled down under the throne of the Kara djordjevićs like 
an empty beer bottle into garbage...” (p. 98). This remark perhaps uncon-
sciously summed up the attitude of the dominant Croat elites towards the 
new state. What really inclined the Croat and Slovene elites to join, unwill-
ingly, the new state was the “fear” of Italy which, among other things, had 
pretensions “to Istria and Dalmatia” (p. 99). On the other hand, Serbia saw 
the new state as the accomplishment of the national striving for the libera-
tion and unification of Serb-inhabited areas. Underestimating the role of 
foreign factors, Calic argues that Yugoslavia “was by no means an artificial 
experimental state dictated by the Machiavellian interests of the great pow-
ers” (p. 98), even though, in the opening chapter of the following part titled 
the “Versailles system”, she clearly states that the great powers created a 
“belt of nation states” from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans which formed a 
sanitary cordon towards “revolutionary bolshevist Russia” and “Germany’s 
revisionist aspirations” (p. 103). 
In the part of the book devoted to the Kingdom of SCS 1918–1929 
and Yugoslavia 1929–1941, factual errors occur more frequently and so does 
the author’s effort to construct false equivalences and a negative image of 
the first Yugoslavia above all from the viewpoint of the idea of progress and 
modernisation in order to emphasise the purported superiority of the post-
1945 federal system. In doing so, Calic fails to acknowledge the tremendous 
achievements the Kingdom made precisely in the area of modernisation: it 
carried out the agrarian reform and colonisation, built thousands of schools, 
educational facilities for women, hospitals and other health facilities, set 
up the universities of Ljubljana and Skoplje and a theatre in Skoplje, and 
emancipated, according to its means, a considerable part of backward and 
undeveloped areas from Kosovo and Macedonia to Bosnia, Herzegovina 
and Montenegro. By the way, in the area of culture, Tito’s Yugoslavia could 
not boast as high quality magazines as the interwar Srpski književni glasnik 
in Belgrade and Nova Evropa in Zagreb.24 In fact, the reader gets the im-
pression that one of the author’s goals is to draw a strong contrast between 
an allegedly Serb-dominated centralist and unitary state whose society is 
23 Ibid.
24 See Lj. Dimić, Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941, 3 vols (Belgrade: 
Stubovi kulture, 1996).
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oppressed by poverty and backwardness and its sheer opposite, moderni-
sation that followed after the establishment of communist dictatorship in 
1945. Calic overlooks that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was organised on 
the model of France, the most progressive European nation at the time, and 
that its demolishers, with the exception of Croat nationalists, were external 
forces of fascist and authoritarian persuasion: Hitler’s Third Reich, Musso-
lini’s Italy, and revisionist states with authoritarian nationalist regimes such 
as Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania.
In the foreground of Calic’s account is the conflict between the 
unitary state concept championed by Serbian politicians and federalism 
championed by Croatian politicians. She gives a detailed description of the 
process of adopting the constitution of 1921 but nonetheless suggests that 
the entire process “was octroyed” and that “the state had a serious lack of 
legitimacy from the very outset” (p. 107). She proceeds to describe in detail 
the Yugoslavism propagated from “above” which was supposed to overcome 
internal divisions because, in Calic’s view, “differences in culture, religion, 
dialect, temperament and mentality between Slovenes and Serbs did not 
seem any greater than those between Venetians and Neapolitans or Bavar-
ians and Prussians”25 (pp. 107–108). Yet, she remarks that by then “it prob-
ably was already too late” to create a Yugoslav nation and that “the idea of 
three tribes left enough room for the fulfilment and assertion of one’s own 
national identity” (p. 109).
Mentioned in that connection are Slovenes who achieved national 
integration precisely within Yugoslavia given that they were free “for the 
first time to cultivate and develop their own language and culture” (p. 109), 
that the University of Ljubljana was established in 1919, Slovenian Radio in 
1928 and, finally, the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1938. It is 
even safe to say that in 1929, when the Kingdom was reorganised into bano-
vinas, they practically obtained a rounded-off ethnic territory: Drava Bano-
vina. The fact is completely ignored that Slovenes had strong support from 
Belgrade and King Alexander himself who made considerable personal do-
nations to various Slovenian scientific and cultural institutions. Calic is of 
the view that the same goes for Croats, integrated in the 1920s through the 
mass national mobilisation of the peasantry effected by the activity of Stj-
epan Radić’s Croatian Peasant Party (p. 112). On the other hand, she claims 
ahistorically that the population of Macedonia “had already had a clear 
awareness of their distinctiveness but were not recognised as a ‘tribe’” even 
though their grouping into Serbs, Bulgarians and Albanians was stronger 
25 Calic does not distinguish between regional and ethnic/national identities. An 
equivalent for her examples (Bavarians, Prussians) in the Yugoslav case would be, say, 
Šumadijans, Vojvodinans, Herzegovinians, Slavonians, Dalmatians etc.
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than their local, geographically defined identity. As far as Bosnian Muslims 
are concerned, Calic claims somewhat confusedly that they “could cultivate 
a distinctive historico-religious, pre-national group consciousness which, in 
their view, only lacked a tribal name”, a consciousness which “had developed 
within the framework set by Islam” and, at the time, “did not necessarily im-
ply a theological or an ideological or an ethnic-national affiliation” (p. 110). 
Yet, a little later she claims that the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation ( JMO) 
had an “ethnic attribute” (p. 115). A similar if milder confusion about the 
identity of Bosnian Muslims can be found later in the book (pp. 142–143).
If Yugoslavism indeed enabled a practically unimpeded building 
of distinctive national identities, it is unclear why Calic seeks to suggest 
a greater-Serbian hegemonism. Apart from reiterating propagandistic al-
legations made by the Croat economist Rudolf Bićanić,26 her key proof of 
the “privileged position of Serbs in the government, army, bureaucracy, po-
lice and many important sectors of society” is a quotation from the Croat 
historian Ivo Banac according to whom “out of a total of 656 ministers 
in Yugoslav governments, which as a rule did not remain long in office, 
452 were Serbs and only 137 Croats, 49 Slovenes and 18 Muslims”, and to 
complement the impression suggested by the figures adds that “it was not 
much different in the army and state administration” (p. 113–114). Finally, 
there is a very explicit, and as uncritical, conclusion: “Social practice showed 
that the common Yugoslav house was nothing but greater-Serbian decor” 
where “many politically engaged people, disappointed with reality, turned 
against the idea of Yugoslavism” (p. 151). The only exception was the com-
munists for whom “Yugoslavism was, as it had been for the Young Bos-
nians before the First World War, not just a vision but daily practice”. The 
truth, however, is that until Stalin’s directive for the creation of the Popular 
Front in the mid-1930s they, vociferously and often in collaboration with 
the Ustashas, decried “greater-Serbian hegemonism” and, acting upon the 
Comintern’s recipe, propagated the demolition of Yugoslavia. So, what we 
have here is not only an absurd confusion but also an injustice to the fol-
lowers of the Young Bosnia movement, genuine supporters of Serbian and 
Yugoslav unification.27
Recent research has seriously challenged the stereotype about the 
“greater-Serbian” character of the Yugoslav state.28 The thesis about “great-
26 E.g. that “parts of the country that belonged to the former Austria-Hungary pay 80% 
of all taxes, while Serbia and Montenegro take more than 70% of investments for their 
infrastructure” (p. 113).
27 See D. Pešić, Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje 1919–1935 (Belgrade: Rad, 
1983), 189–197 and 230–236.
28 S. Božić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 
2008) as well as her “Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): between the myth of ‘greater Ser-
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er-Serbian hegemony” was in fact an instrument, propagandistic above all, 
of the Croat political elite for achieving the national homogenisation of the 
masses and for ensuring as good a position as possible in their escalating 
conflict with the Serb political elite.
The “greater-Serbian hegemony” thesis, a hollow phrase which was 
quite dear to the communists too, can find no support in the documentary 
sources for the simple fact that the Serb elites had no means to impose 
hegemony. As opposed to 960 factories in Slovenia and Croatia in 1919, 
Serbia had no more than 70, and the end of the war had found it ravaged 
in every way, including the loss of a third of its pre-war population. Of a 
total of 2.5 billion dinars deposited in all Yugoslav banks, two billions were 
in Zagreb banks and so Zagreb, formerly a provincial Austro-Hungarian 
town, practically became the financial centre of the interwar Yugoslav state. 
Slavonia provides a telling example of the actual scale of “greater-Serbian 
hegemony”. Of its 2112 civil servants in 1921, 206, or 9.75%, were Serbs 
even though they accounted for 23.4% of the total population. Calic also 
fails to mention the fact that a considerable number of officers of the former 
Austro-Hungarian army were admitted to the ranks of the new army of 
the Kingdom of SCS, even some known to have committed crimes against 
Serbs.29
That Yugoslavism was not exactly a “vision” and “everyday practice” 
to the communists is evidenced by the Fourth Congress of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) held in Dresden in 1928, which Calic does not 
mention. She mentions the Third Conference of the CPY held in January 
1924, mistakenly calling it the Third Congress (which, however, was held in 
Vienna in 1926), which addressed the national question for the first time 
(p. 117) in terms of federalisation. The Fourth Congress, however, envisaged 
the demolition of the Yugoslav state and the creation of independent Slo-
venia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia (with support from IMRO), 
while expressing support to the “Kosovo Committee” in the struggle for 
“Greater Albania”, i.e. for the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija by Alba-
nia, just as it envisaged the annexation of northern Vojvodina to Hungary.30
The part of the book devoted to the first Yugoslavia contains quite a 
number of unfounded assertions such as the one that the “Catholic Church 
for the most part took a loyal stance towards the state in 1918” or that the 
Catholic clergy, “with the exception of the archbishop of Sarajevo Josip 
Štadler”, “was pro-Yugoslav” (p. 140). Confrontation of the Catholic Church 
bian hegemony’ and social reality”, Balcanica LXI (2010), 185–208.
29 For more detail see M. Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine SHS 1918–1921 (Belgrade: Narodna 
knjiga, 1988).
30 Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985), 107.
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with Belgrade is downplayed to a mere reaction to the failure to conclude 
a concordat, and there is yet another attempt to draw a false equivalence, 
in this case between the “laic” Croatian Catholic movement and the “pro-
fascist and ultranationalist” Orlovi (Eagles) and Križari (Crusaders), on the 
one hand, and an “extremist Orthodox faction” (svetosavlje), on the other (p. 
160). Calic is obviously unaware that the attitude of the Catholic Church at 
first towards the creation of the Yugoslav state and then the state itself was 
on the whole explicitly negative,31 while the Croatian Catholic movement 
can hardly be described as laic.32
Calic states that J. B. Tito “returned to his homeland in early 1935” 
from training in the USSR, while he then in fact left for the USSR and 
returned in late 1936.33 What should also be noted is her not overly critical 
portrayal of the communists who “believed in universal historical laws and 
in the building of humane society in the world in which revolutionary con-
sciousness should triumph over ethnic intolerance”, were tied by “the faith 
in a just future and the unflinching will for change”, and enjoyed “an ever 
growing support of intellectuals, middle classes and youth” (p. 158). If the 
importance and extent of the support extended to the communists is played 
up, the importance of the Ustasha movement and the extent of support it 
enjoyed is, to put it mildly, downplayed, which is combined with an attempt 
to equate it with its ideological counterpart in Serbia, the Zbor movement, 
which had a negligible support in its environment (pp. 153–156). 
Even though formally balanced and unbiased, the next part of the 
book, devoted to the Yugoslav space in the Second World War, suffers from 
serious shortcomings: numerous factual oversights, far-fetched construc-
tions, selective presentation of facts, unqualified use of disputable casualty 
figures, the already observed tendency towards false equivalence and a quite 
partial portrayal of one warring party as morally superior to the others. Her 
account of Tito’s communist movement is slanted and uncritically depen-
dent on the image the communist regime created of itself. Apart from some 
slight differences and scarce critical remarks, invariably made in passing, 
her interpretation largely coincides with the official Titoist narrative, or the 
official version of history imposed in the course of the thirty-five years of 
communist dictatorship in the second Yugoslavia.
Speaking about the establishment of the Independent State of Croa-
tia (NDH), she says that the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) 
31 D. R. Živojinović, Vatikan, Srbija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države (Belgrade: Nolit, 
1980); N. Žutić & LJ. Dimić, Rimokatolički klerikalizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–
1941. Prilozi za istoriju (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački novinski centar, 1992).
32 Ibid. 289–299.
33 Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, 152.
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Vladko Maček declined the offer to be its prime minister (p. 172), which 
is true, but it is also true, and she remains silent on that, that he called 
upon the Croat people to be loyal to the new Ustasha regime and that most 
members of the Croatian Peasant Defence and the Croatian Civil Defence 
sided with the new regime.34 She states that the Ustasha regime relied on 
“militia, army, secret police, special courts and more than twenty concentra-
tion camps”, but claims that “support to the new regime remained thin” and 
that it found approval only “in the right wing of the HSS, in a part [sic] of 
the Catholic Church and among intellectuals and nationalist university stu-
dents”. Calic’s claim that “this anyway heterogeneous base crumbled within 
only a few months of the Ustasha taking power” (pp. 172–174) seems to 
be contradicted by the fact that the regime remained in place until May 
1945.35 On the other hand, speaking of General Milan Nedić, Calic seeks 
to equate him with D. Ljotić, leader of the pro-fascist Zbor, losing sight of 
the fact that Nedić did not command the Serbian Volunteers Corps which 
was organised by Ljotić and placed under direct German command. Nedić 
was and remained the local governor of an occupied rump Serbia with no 
power of decision.
Calic almost entirely accepts the official communist interpretation of 
the civil war 1941–45, especially as regards the relationship between Chet-
niks and Partisans (pp. 181–188). Even though she correctly identifies their 
respective social bases as well as the ideological differences between the 
two antifascist movements, she makes no distinction between Dragoljub 
Mihailović’s Yugoslav Home Army (YHA) and Chetniks. The latter is a 
general and imprecise term under which may also be subsumed smaller col-
laborationist groups such as the one of Kosta Pećanac. She argues explicitly 
that D. Mihailović “sent false news about military successes to London and 
at the same time received financial aid from the Serbian collaborationist 
government and served the Germans and Italians” (p. 181), that he, “in June 
1941 circulated a memorandum titled ‘Homogeneous Serbia’ envisaging the 
expulsion of Croats and Muslims from a large part of territory”, which im-
plies that he advocated ethnic cleansing (p. 184). Calic apparently is unaware 
of the reliably established fact that the memorandum was not Mihailović’s; 
it was put together by Stevan Moljević, a lawyer from Banjaluka, whom 
Mihailović first met in May 1942. She also seems to be unaware that this 
piece of writing had never been discussed, let alone adopted by Mihailović’s 
34 Paramilitary units set up by the HSS as “a state in the state” in the mid-1930s. Calic 
refers to them as “peasant and civil guard” and estimates their strength at about 200,000 
men (p. 159).
35 See e.g. D. Stranjaković, Najveći zločini sadašnjice. Patnje i stradanja srpskog naroda u 
Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj od 1941. do 1945 (Gornji Milanovac 1991).
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movement, but remained Moljević’s personal view. Moreover, she uncriti-
cally reiterates post-war communist propaganda about Mihailović’s willing 
and earnest collaboration, thereby creating an ideological black-and-white 
rather than scholarly picture of the Second World War in Yugoslavia.36 If 
Mihailović really was such an earnest collaborator with the Germans, how 
come that in a large number of German documents Mihailović, and not 
Tito, figures as the Third Reich’s enemy number one in the Balkans almost 
until the end of the war.37 As if the “wanted” circular for General Mihailović 
was not issued as early as 1941 and for them both in 1943 on the same 
poster. A photograph of the poster is available in books that Calic cites.38
Many YHA members were incarcerated in the camps in Banjica, 
Sajmište and in Niš. The one in Banjica even had an alternative name, DM 
camp, camp for supporters of D[ragoljub] M[ihailović], while communist 
supporters did not begin to be incarcerated there until 1943. The book 
makes no mention whatsoever of thousands of Mihailović’s men who were 
captured and sent to concentration camps at Mauthausen and Osnabruck, 
where many of them died. Nor is there any mention of many non-Serbs in 
the ranks of his army (e.g. Croats Niko Bartulović and Vladimir Predavec, 
Bosnian Muslims Mustafa Mulalić, Dr Ismet Popovac, Fehmija Musakadić 
etc.), of the YHA units in Slovenia (Karel Novak, Uroš Šušterčič – Vojvoda 
Triglavski, Mihailović’s intelligence officer Aleksandar Bajt “Berman”, sub-
sequently a leading Yugoslav economist) even though the subject has by 
now received quite a body of useful literature – notably books by Kosta 
Nikolić, memoirs of Dimitrije Djordjević and Zvonimir Vučković, Western 
books on Mihailović and his soldiers – which offers a different picture from 
the one painted by Calic and her, primarily Croat, literature.39
In Calic’s view, on the other hand, Tito and the Partisans did “quite 
the opposite”: they “preached concord among peoples”; “advocated a so-
36 Calic does not seem to have consulted the best, now classical work on the issue of the 
relationship between Tito, Milhailović and the Allies: W. R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic 
and the Allies 1941–1945 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973). See also B. 
Lazitch, Tito et la révolution yougoslave (Paris: Fasquelle, 1957); N. Beloff, Tito’s Flawed 
Legacy. Yugoslavia and the West (London: V. Gollancz, 1985); K. Christitch, Les faux-
frères. Mirages et réalités yougoslaves (Paris: Flammarion, 1996).
37 I. Avakumović, Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima (London: Naša reč, 1969).
38 D. T. Bataković, Nova istorija srpskog naroda (Belgrade: Naš dom, 2000).
39 Z. Vučković, Sećanja iz rata. Od otpora do gradjanskog rata, 2. vols (Belgrade: Čiča, 
1990); D. Djordjević, ožiljci i uspomene, 2 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994–95); K. Nikolić, 
Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 1941–1945, 3 vols (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999); B. 
Dimitrijević & K. Nikolić, Djeneral Mihailović (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2000); Slovenački 
četnici (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2006); Al. Bajt, Bermanov dosije (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 
2006).
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cialist revolution”; “built a combat force with firm leadership within a few 
months”; and were successful because “they managed to combine all those 
different forms of protest and resistance under the ‘popular liberation’ slo-
gan”; given the Chetniks’ waiting strategy, Tito “challenged Mihailović’s 
title of not only the greatest hero of resistance but also of the future head 
of state [sic]” as early as 1941 (pp. 184–185), and by the time the uprising 
in Serbia collapsed in 1941 his forces had “about 80,000 men and women 
under arms” (p. 186). There are detailed descriptions of their difficulties in 
1942 (p. 187), of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustasha offensives against 
them (pp. 189–191) from which they emerged victorious; she uncritically 
attributes to Tito the “legendary qualities of a leader” and claims that he “ra-
diated with self-confidence, determination and natural authority” (p. 189). 
She emphasises in particular the Partisans’ contribution to the emancipa-
tion of women who were given active and passive voting rights in 1942 (p. 
207), and in general their positive achievements in the area of culture, the 
economy, education and progress under wartime conditions (pp. 205–208) 
even though the purpose of most of their activity was to spread communist 
propaganda and, ultimately, to establish a Stalinist type of government by 
revolutionary means.
As far as the uprising of 1941 is concerned, Calic does mention that 
Chetniks and Partisans fought together against the Wehrmacht, but fails to 
impart the important fact that the first liberated city in occupied Europe 
was Loznica, western Serbia: it was liberated in August 1941 by Chetniks 
under the command of Lt.-Col. Veselin Misita. She also mentions that the 
two parted ways in September 1941, but places the blame on the Chetniks 
(p. 185) without mentioning the fact that one of the reasons for the split 
was the overt establishing of communist authorities on the ground. Even 
though she is explicit about Mihailović’s collaboration, she claims that the 
Germans declined his offer and attacked his headquarters on Ravna Gora 
(p. 184). The Chetniks’ occasional and brief collaboration with the Italians 
is an incontestable fact – it was the result of their enmity towards the Ger-
mans, Ustashas, Partisans, Ljotić’s and Muslim supporters of Hitler – but 
it did not have the character Calic attributes to it in a bid to fit it into her 
black-and-white picture of the very complex processes that were unfolding 
in the civil war in Yugoslavia.
It is precisely into this black-and-white and consequently inaccurate 
picture of the Partisans fighting alone against all that the secret negotiations 
between Tito’s representatives and the Wehrmacht held in March 1943 
can hardly be fitted. Highest functionaries of the communist movement 
(V. Velebit, K. Popović, M. Djilas) negotiated in Zagreb, the capital of the 
Ustasha NDH, about collaboration against the Allies whose possible land-
ing on the Adriatic coast would have inevitably meant Allied support to 
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Mihailović. They expressed their readiness to fight the Western Allies and 
Mihailović’s forces side by side with the Wehrmacht. Mihailović’s YHA, as 
the bearer of pre-war Yugoslavia’s state legitimacy, was the main in the eyes 
of Tito’s communist forces and the latter did not even try to conceal it from 
the Germans. This is a clear example of how misleading can be the simpli-
fication of the exceptionally complex picture of the civil war in Yugoslavia 
where various armies – with the exception of the Croatian Ustasha and 
regular army forces (domobrani) who remained Hitler’s faithful allies until 
the bitter end – and movements fought against one another, frequently “ev-
eryone against everyone” and occasionally collaborating with one or another 
occupation force.40
Calic uncritically takes over the post-war propaganda claim that the 
Partisan army was a 300,000-strong force in 1943 (p. 190). According to 
the statement of Tito’s main intelligence officer V. Velebit at the above-
mentioned March 1943 negotiations, the Partisan army had about 50,000–
60,000 combatants.41 Two quite serious oversights should also be noted at 
this point. Speaking of the Second Session of the Antifascist Council for 
Popular Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce on 29 and 30 Novem-
ber 1943, Calic claims that “142 delegates from all parts of the country pro-
claimed themselves to be the supreme legislative and executive body. Only 
Macedonians were unable to get to Bosnia due to fighting” (p. 191). The fact 
is not mentioned that these 142 delegates were a minority by comparison 
to 161 absent delegates and that the quorum problem was “solved” in such a 
way that the absent were declared to be present. Moreover, the AVNOJ was 
not even a representative body with any kind of legitimacy but rather an ad-
hoc assembly of communist functionaries and few lesser pre-war politicians. 
The other oversight is one of selectiveness. In order to show that “none of 
the institutions of socialist Yugoslavia embodied the ideal of ‘brotherhood 
and unity’ as clearly as that multinational volunteer army” and to create 
the impression that all Yugoslav peoples equally contributed to the struggle 
against fascism, Calic offers the figures for the composition of the Partisan 
army in the spring of 1944: “44% Serbs, 30% Croats, 10% Slovenes, 4% 
Montenegrins, 2.5% Bosnian Muslims and other ethnic groups” (p. 207). 
But it should be borne in mind that she is talking about 1944, the year 
when, after Italy’s capitulation and the Wehrmacht’s defeat in the USSR, 
the Third Reich was evidently losing the war; therefore a comparison with 
the composition of Partisan and Chetnik units in 1941 would reveal a much 
higher percentage (more than 80%) of Serbs and, consequently, not as ideal 
40 M. Leković, Martovski pregovori 1943. godine (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985).
41 For more detail see P. Simić, Tito, tajna veka (Belgrade: Novosti, 2009).
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a picture as the propaganda one uncritically taken over from the Titoist 
literature and offered as a fact. 
Both chapters devoted to ethnic cleansings, mass crimes and the dy-
namic of violence offer detailed accounts and rightfully point to the crimes 
committed by Ustasha, Chetnik, German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian 
and Albanian forces (pp. 196–205). What is controversial is Calic’s inter-
pretation of Chetniks’ crimes as resulting from a pre-existing ideologically 
coloured master-plan for ethnic cleansing. Such plans had indeed been 
there in all other cases, and in this one, the master-plan is supposed to have 
been the obscure brochure “Homogeneous Serbia” attributed once again to 
General Mihailović (p. 199) instead of its actual writer, Stevan Moljević. 
This is yet another attempt at false balance or ethnic symmetry, at equating 
D. Mihailović’s antifascist movement with all collaborationist forces that 
committed ethnically motivated crimes, most infamously the Ustashas. The 
following two quotations of several similar in this part of the book would 
seem a good illustration: “Just as the Ustashas dreamed of an ethnically 
‘pure’ greater Croatia, so the Chetniks trumpeted the idea of a greater Ser-
bia” (p. 199) and “the Chetniks did not at all lag behind the Ustashas in 
barbarity” (p. 203).42 That the Chetniks, especially smaller groups that did 
not recognise Mihailović’s command authority, committed crimes is not 
a matter of dispute. But then again they did not have the character that 
Calic ascribes to them given that they were more often than not committed 
against Serbs of different ideological persuasions (e.g. supporters of Ljotić 
and communists), and when committed against other national and ethnic 
groups, in the NDH, Montenegro and Kosovo, they as a rule were a re-
taliation for crimes previously committed against Serb population. What 
Calic also tends to overlook is that the captured Chetniks, whom she sees 
as classical collaborationists and not an antifascist movement, were sent to 
Nazi death camps, while the Ustashas, whom she equates with the Chetniks 
over and over again, fought shoulder to shoulder with Wehrmacht troops at 
Stalingrad in 1942 (Francetić’s “Black Legion”).
42 E.g. Calic says that “in the summer of 1941 the Croat and Muslim Ustasha mili-
tia murdered hundreds [sic] of Serb families and burnt down their houses”, but adds 
straightaway that “thousands [sic] of Muslims in Foča, Goražde, Vlasenica, Srebrenica 
and many other places fell victims to massacres” (p. 203), leaving out the fact that these 
massacres were committed by Chetniks in retaliation for thousands and not hundreds 
of Serb civilians in eastern Bosnia massacred by Muslim Ustashas from the cited places. 
There is not a single word about the Ustashas’ grisly crimes in Herzegovina whose 
brutality outstrips all other crimes committed in the NDH. For more on this see S. 
Skoko, Pokolji hercegovačkih Srba ’41 (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1991) and his Krva-
vo kolo hercegovačko 1941–1942, 2 vols (Pale: SKPD Prosvjeta and Belgrade: Planeta, 
1999–2000).
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On the other hand, what is worthy of mention and credit is Calic’s 
account of the role of the Catholic Church in the NDH and, in particular, 
of the archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in the conversion of 200,000 Orthodox 
Christian Serbs to Catholicism or of the Catholic press which “extolled the 
Ustashas”. Calic even mentions a few other clerics who took part in Cathol-
icisation and crimes (p. 199, 202), although with the typical qualification 
that “the role of the Catholic Church in Croatia and its archbishop Alojzije 
Steppinac remains highly controversial till this day” (p. 198–199). Magnum 
Crimen, the monumental book of Viktor Novak,43 a Croatian historian of 
Yugoslav orientation appalled at the complicity of the Catholic clergy in 
the Ustasha regime, amply furnished with archival documents, press ex-
cerpts and first-hand testimonies, is not even listed in the bibliography, let 
alone quoted from. Perhaps in order to downplay the extent of the Catholic 
clergy’s collaboration with the Ustasha regime? Only those who have not 
consulted Magnum Crimen can be misled into believing that the Ustasha 
regime had the support of “only a part of the Catholic Church” (p. 173).44 
An aspect of wartime developments that remains unknown to the 
reader concerns the Partisans’ crimes against political opponents committed 
in the name of the “revolution” and their onslaught on “class enemies”, espe-
cially in 1941/2 in Montenegro and Herzegovina. Calic does mention but in 
passing the clampdown on “alleged traitors, spies and saboteurs” who were 
sentenced to death by makeshift “popular courts” without due judicial process, 
a fate that also befell “hesitants, deserters and collaborationists” (p. 206).
The last chapter of this part of the book devoted to the Second World 
War is concerned with the estimated number of war victims but most of all 
with how those victims, as a negative legacy, burdened relations among the 
Yugoslav peoples, notably Serbs and Croats. Calic rightly observes that the 
official figure of 1.7 million dead is an overestimation. The figure in fact rep-
resents the demographic loss submitted as the actual number of war victims 
43 Viktor Novak’s classical, unavoidable work on the subject, Magnum Crimen. Pola vi-
jeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj, was first published in Zagreb and had 1119 pages (1948), 
and then, in an abridged version, in Sarajevo (3 vols, 1960) and, finally, reprinted in 
Belgrade (1986, with a preface by Jakov Blažević).
44 For a general introduction with an overview of the Ustasha regime see J. Steinberg, All 
or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 
1990); M. A. Rivelli, Un génocide occulté. Etat indépendant de Croatie 1941–1945 (Laus-
anne: L’Age d’Homme, 1999). Rivelli is also the author of the best work on Stepinac, 
based on foreign, mostly Italian source materials, L’Arcivescovio del genocidio (Milan: 
Kaos Edizioni, 1999). For additional documentary evidence for the mass collaboration 
of the Catholic clergy see D. R. Živojinović and D. Lučić, Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo. 
Prilozi za Magnum Crimen (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988) and D. R. Živojinović, Vati-
kan, Katolička crkva i jugoslovenska vlast 1941–1958 (Belgrade:  Prosveta & Tersit, 1994).
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by E. Kardelj at the Paris conference in 1946. She then relies on the amateur 
works of Kočović (1985) and Žerjavić (1989) and offers the figure of about 
one million victims,45 of whom “500,000 Serbs, 200,000 Croats and up to 
100,000 Muslims”, and another million as an indirect loss, to conclude that 
“all in all, Yugoslavia lost about two million people in the Second World 
War” (p. 209). The censuses of 1931 and 1948 were not sufficiently reliable, 
and there was no way to estimate how many people had been killed, how 
many had died in concentration camps, how many had never returned from 
emigration or managed to leave the country at the end of the war. The only 
accurate thing that can be said is that “the number of killed, tortured and 
exiled has become a political issue” as well as the rather general claim that 
“many subsequent Yugoslav problems had their roots in that epoch” (p. 210), 
which may be a euphemism for denazification that never took place.46
As an example of such a political issue Calic gives the Jasenovac 
camp, the infamous symbol of the Ustasha regime of terror, and quotes 
the official Yugoslav figure of 700,000 victims and the figures put forth 
by Croat and Serb emigration circles, 30,000 and 1.1 million respectively. 
However, in his report to Himmler of February 1942, Glaise-Horstenau 
gave an estimate of more than 300,000 Serbs viciously murdered by the 
Ustashas.47 Calic, instead of trying to explain why the communist authori-
ties, which are the source of the abovementioned official figure (which she 
fails to mention), did not permit independent inquiries, simply states that 
they did not, and adds the fact that Jasenovac has become the place of op-
posing cultures of memory. And she does not stop there but proceeds to 
add a highly debatable assumption, which she even repeats in another place 
in the book, that “probably about 200,000 people perished in all Croatian 
concentration camps”,48 relying solely on the Croatian-American historian 
Jozo Tomasevich (p. 210). To accept this figure would necessarily mean to 
accept that in 1941–1945 in “more than twenty concentration camps” an 
average of 10,000 people per camp perished, which is highly unlikely to say 
the least. Namely, as early as 1941, 38,000 Serbs, about 2,000 Jews and 188 
45 Prilozi istraživanju zločina genocida i ratnih zločina, ed. J. Mirković (Belgrade: Muzej 
žrtava genocida, 2009)
46 See esp. Z. Djordjević, Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Bel-
grade: ABC-Grafika, 1977).
47 V. Kazimirović, Nemački general u Zagrebu (Kragujevac: Prizma and Belgrade: Centar 
film, 1966), 122. A reliable overview is provided by E. Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia 
1941–1945. A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions (Chicago: Institute for Balkan 
Affairs, 1962). 
48 See A. Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 2 vols (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 
1986–87).
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Croats carefully recorded by name were killed in the Jadovno camp alone 
(the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag system of camps).49
Contrary to Calic’s claim, what decided the outcome of the civil war 
in Yugoslavia was not the self-reliant fight of Tito’s Partisans. The decision 
to relinquish Yugoslavia to communists and to shift military and political 
support from Mihailović to Tito had been made in Tehran in 1943 as a 
concession of the Western Allies, Roosevelt and Churchill, to Stalin and the 
USSR.50 The liberation of Belgrade on 20 October 1944 is misattributed to 
the Partisans instead of the Red Army whose several divisions, hundreds of 
tanks and aircraft, motor corps and brigades, incomparably more numerous 
and better equipped than Tito’s forces, were instrumental in establishing 
communism in Yugoslavia (p. 213). There is no mention in the book of 
the fact that the Soviets met a friendly reception from Mihailović’s troops 
and that they jointly liberated several towns, from Kruševac to Kraljevo; in 
return, the Soviets turned Chetniks over to Partisans, who arrested them en 
masse. This policy is explained a few pages later, where we learn that Tito 
secretly flew from the island of Vis to Moscow to “persuade Stalin to send 
Red Army troops for the liberation of Belgrade” (pp. 217–218). Combined 
with the author’s unqualified claim that communism in Yugoslavia “won 
on its own strength” (p. 218), this boils down to a denial of the historical 
fact – acknowledged even by the Titoist press until the split with Moscow 
in 1948 – that Soviet troops were instrumental in Tito’s installing in power. 
Once the German troops were driven out, they handed over power to the 
Partisans.
In her account of the liberation of Yugoslavia and “consolidation of 
communist rule”, Calic does not remain silent on the crimes the Partisans 
committed “systematically and extensively”. What she remains silent on is 
the communists’ crimes against “class enemies”, mostly in Serbia where, ac-
cording to the latest research data, there were as many as 57,000 victims 
known by name, much more than in other parts of Yugoslavia. A few dozen 
thousand farmers, lawyers, pre-war civil servants, small and big industrial-
ists, merchants, artisans, priests and intellectuals were accused of collabo-
rationism and, as a rule without due judicial process, executed while their 
property was confiscated.51
49 Dj. Zatezalo, Jadovno, kompleks ustaških logora 1941, 2 vols (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava 
genocida, 2007). 
50 For more see V. Pavlović, Od monarhije do republike. SAD i Jugoslavija 1941–1945 
(Belgrade: Clio, 1998).
51 For more see Srdjan Cvetković, Izmedju srpa i čekića. Politička represija u Srbiji 1944–
1953 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006).
M. Mišić, On a One-sided Interpretation of the Yugoslav Past 371
As far as the establishing of “popular democracy” is concerned, Calic 
admits that the post-war elections can be considered as “neither free nor 
fair”. Yet, it seems that she finds arguments for justifying the imposition of 
the one-party system and dictatorship in a superficial and evidently unreli-
able report of a contemporary British diplomat that “the masses” in Central 
and Eastern Europe, “due to their war and post-war experience”, were will-
ing to accept a “regime that promises order and security even at the cost 
of renouncing personal freedom and the freedom of political decision”, as 
well as Tito’s belief that democracy would lead to “ethno-political polarisa-
tion and the disintegration of the country” and thwart “politics based on 
industrial progress and social justice” (pp. 219–220). Speaking of the trials 
of major war criminals which were supposed to take place, she mentions 
A. Pavelić, M. Nedić and D. Mihailović in the same paragraph, thereby, 
inadvertently perhaps, subsuming them symbolically under one umbrella 
(p. 220). The reader is not informed about international mobilisation in 
Mihailović’s defence which, in addition to pre-war democrats, involved 
many European intellectuals and five hundred US army pilots rescued by 
Mihailović’s forces in the autumn of 1944 (Operation Halyard).52 On the 
other hand, a separate paragraph is devoted to the trial of archbishop St-
epinac, his sentence to “sixteen years in prison he spent in house arrest” (p. 
219) and the reaction or, more precisely, opposition of the Catholic Church 
which was what led to Stepinac’s transfer to house arrest after five years in 
prison, which Calic does not find pertinent to mention.
Tito’s alleged fear of “ethno-political polarisation” does not seem to 
have played any role either in the federal reorganisation of the country or 
in meeting national-political demands. Calic writes about the liberation of 
Istria and Dalmatia from the Italians, “whereby the process of the unifica-
tion of Croats was rounded off ”, but fails to mention the incorporation into 
Yugoslavia of the so-called Slovenian Littoral, probably subsuming it under 
Istria (p. 221). She proceeds to speak in detail about nation building from 
above carried out by the communists with a view to constructing Macedo-
nian identity, and about the situation in Kosovo, where as early as 1943/4, 
at the Bujanovac conference, the Albanian communists stated that their 
co-nationals had always striven for unification with Albania (pp. 223–224). 
Calic mentions the quelling of the rebellion of the Ballists in 1945, their 
52 The picture of the civil war would have been considerably closer to reality had Calic 
taken the trouble to consult the literature which does not go in favour of her black-
and-white simplification, e.g. D. Martin, The Web of Disinformation. Churchill ’s Yugoslav 
Blunder (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990); M. I. Lees, The Rape of Serbia. The British 
Role in Tito’s Grab for Power 1943–1944 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990); B. Miljuš, 
Revolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945 (Lausanne – Belgrade – Sarajevo 1991).
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collaboration with the Germans and Italians, but leaves out the murdering 
and ethnic cleansing of Serbs during the war years (about 10,000 murdered 
and nearly 100,000 exiled). She unconvincingly explains away Tito’s “con-
ciliatory course” towards Albanians with the claim that “communists had 
never been strong in Kosovo, and many Albanians were nationalists”, which 
was why he “subsequently authorised the expulsion of the Serb colonists, 
which was decisive for the pacification of Kosovo Albanians” and that he 
“decided that Kosovo and Metohija be granted the status of an autonomous 
region of the Republic of Serbia, which was a sort of a compromise between 
the Serbian demand to rule the territory and the Albanian desire for inde-
pendence” (p. 224). Calic stops short of drawing the logical conclusion that 
in that way Tito in fact awarded Albanian nationalism which, as she does 
say accurately, had fought on the side of fascism in the Second World War 
even though the task he placed before the communists was to “uproot all 
forms of nationalist and religious hatred” (p. 220). Also, she just mentions 
in passing that Tito was thinking now and then of uniting “Kosovo to Al-
bania” in order for the latter to “join a larger union of states in the Balkans” 
(p. 224).53  
The following two parts of the book devoted to the “second Yugo-
slavia” – “Socialist Yugoslavia 1945–1980” and “After Tito 1980–1991” – 
discuss the establishment of the communist regime and the country’s re-
organisation on federal principles. A piece of information that is missing, 
however, is that Tito’s regime in four post-war years was a mere copy of the 
Soviet system, and the Constitution of the country, Democratic Federal Yu-
goslavia soon renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, a copy 
of Stalin’s Constitution of 1936. Calic admits that the communists gave 
up the idea of building “one supra-ethnic Yugoslav nation” and that “every 
people was given its own state”, i.e. republic. Also admitting that it was im-
portant to Tito “to preclude the dominance of the most numerous people, 
Serbs”, she does not find it in the least problematical that the Serbs, who 
even according to her own statistical data had made the greatest contribu-
tion to the struggle against fascism, were divided among three republics, 
that Montenegro was separated from Serbia (just as the Montenegrins be-
came a separate people by decree) and that within Serbia itself were created 
“two autonomous regions”, Vojvodina, which in fact was an autonomous 
province, and Kosovo and Metohija, which was not granted the status of an 
autonomous province until 1963 and whose full name the author reduces to 
53 For a good analysis see Dj. Borozan, Velika Albanija. Porijeklo, ideje, praksa (Belgrade: 
Vojnoistorijski institut VJ, 1995). For an overview of the entire period see N. B. Popović, 
ed., Kosovo i Metohija u velikoalbanskim planovima 1878–2000 (Belgrade: Institut za 
savremenu istoriju, 2001).
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“Kosovo”. She claims that “people were not required to identify themselves 
as members of an ethnic group or as citizens of a federal state because these 
were easily combined in Yugoslavia” and that federalism “institutionalised 
multiple identities and allegiances” (p. 225). Calic seems to overlook that it 
was federalism that over time deepened the divides between peoples and 
republics and set the stage for further ethno-political polarisation. In a bid 
to rationalise the obvious contradiction between the communists’ struggle 
against nationalisms on the one hand and their instigation of them on the 
other, she comes up with the communist belief that “national identities 
must not be suppressed because they are the historically necessary transi-
tion to socialism” (pp. 225–226). A more careful perusal of the ample critical 
literature on Titoist policies and inter-national strife might have hopefully 
led to more objective conclusions.54   
The chapters devoted to the post-war reconstruction, general popula-
tion education, the building of the socialist economy, transition to industrial 
society, urbanisation, development of tourism, consumerist society, cultural 
opening to the West and social change in general (pp. 227–230, 242–245, 
253–260, 263–265, 273–276), reveal particularly well the author’s under-
standing of Yugoslavia as a country that Tito “turned into a development-
oriented dictatorship”, which in a way implies her subscription to the idea 
of “authoritarian modernisation” as a theoretical model. All these quite sym-
pathetic accounts of the achievements of Yugoslav socialism are not devoid 
of some, though softened, criticism. For instance, Calic’s account of the 
infamous collectivisation of the countryside, the “absorption” of the agricul-
tural surplus workforce by industry and the compulsory sale of agricultural 
products says that in addition to party agitators “the police often assisted 
in mustering the labour force: men were threatened with guns, women and 
children were locked in dark cellars. Be that as it may, results were soon 
there”, as if collectivisation or the “socialist transformation of the country-
side”, unlike the USSR, was meant to be brought about “more slowly and, 
above all, on a voluntary basis”. The latter is certainly not true, as evidenced 
by thousands of first-hand testimonies about forced collectivisation, arrests, 
54 To mention but a few relevant books such as N. Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy. Yugosla-
via and the West since 1945 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); K. Čavoški, Tito: tehnologija 
vlasti (Belgrade: Dosije, 1990); S. Djukić, Kako se dogodio vodja (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 
1991); D. T. Bataković, Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies (Lausanne: L’Age 
d’Homme, 1994); S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold 
War (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995); R. M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided. 
The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1999); D. G. C. Thomas, ed., Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determi-
nation, Intervention (Lexington Books, 2003); G. Troude, Conflits identitaires dans la 
Yougoslavie de Tito 1960–1980 (Paris: Editions de l’Association Pierre Belon, 2007). 
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long prison sentences, pulling out men’s moustaches and other ways of hu-
miliating opponents to collectivisation.55
The growing demands of Slovenia and Croatia for further decentrali-
sation and economic liberalisation, met by the 8th Congress of the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and opposed by the alleged “Serbian 
centralists”, led to the breakdown of many companies and, consequently, to a 
loss of jobs. The author accurately observes that “the regime turned the situ-
ation to its advantage” by opening up the borders and allowing “1.1 million” 
people to leave the country in search for a job, or “temporary employment 
abroad” as it was called (p. 283). Had it not been for these “guest workers” 
and the generous remittances they sent home, the Yugoslav economy would 
have collapsed. Speaking of ever growing regional differences despite the 
“economic miracle”, Calic correctly observes that “the intra-Yugoslav terms 
of trade benefited only the industries of Slovenia and Croatia, while being 
detrimental to the structurally less developed parts of the country” and that 
“politically stronger republics”, which she fails to name but obviously thinks 
of Slovenia and Croatia, “sought to channel investment towards their re-
gions” (p. 284). On the other hand, describing the downfall of A. Ranković, 
she offers no evidence to support her claim that he “above all advocated 
discrimination against the Albanians, Muslims and Turks in Kosovo” and 
that “he was increasingly considered a liability even by his Serbian party 
fellows” (p. 285). Calic either does not know or does not want to say that 
Ranković’s political belief was that of integral Yugoslavism. He was a pro-
ponent of centralism and, as such, a harsh opponent of separatism, Albanian 
included, and of the further crumbling of the Yugoslav state through further 
federalisation.
Calic takes a brief look at the Macedonians and their identity which, 
in her view, “grew roots very quickly because it was built on the real aware-
ness of national distinctiveness”, and puts forward the inaccurate claim 
that Macedonia was granted a national church after its separation from the 
Archbishopric of Ohrid in 1958 and the alleged recognition of the metro-
politan of Macedonia by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1967 as a result 
of “difficult negotiations”. Established at the initiative of the Macedonian 
communists and in contravention to canon law, the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church has not till this day been recognised by any other Orthodox church 
in the world, the Serbian least of all.56
55 A detailed review of that period and the practices of the communist government 
in J. Popov, Drama na vojvodjanskom selu (1945–1952). Obavezni otkup poljoprivrednih 
proizvoda (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2002). See also D. Tošić, Kolektivizacija u Jugoslaviji 
1949–1952 (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2002).
56 Dj. Slijepčević, Makedonsko crkveno pitanje (Munich: Iskra, 1969).
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As for the cause of mass demonstrations in Kosovo in 1968 and the 
albanisation of the province, Calic puts forward her conclusion that “Tito’s 
attempt to create a distinctive Kosovo Albanian national identity failed” (p. 
304). It remains completely unclear where the author could get the absurd 
idea of a “Kosovo national identity” when she says herself that it was after the 
downfall of Ranković that “liberalisation opened the way for a far-reaching 
albanisation of the province” (p. 304). Despite all concessions made to the 
ethnic Albanians since 1945 they were dissatisfied because “their province 
did not yet have the status of a republic and, consequently, the right to se-
cession” and thus “in October and November 1968 violent clashes broke out 
in Kosovo and western Macedonia. The protesters demanded a republic and 
a constitution, and some of them, the unification of all Albanian-inhabited 
areas” (p. 305). An attempt at omission is obvious here considering that the 
central demand of the demonstrators, then as well as thirteen years later, 
was the secession of Kosovo, Metohija and western Macedonia from Yu-
goslavia and unification with Albania (“We are the children of Skanderbeg 
and the army of Enver Hoxha!”)
The author then proceeds to speak of “linguistic nationalism” (pp. 
306–309) and the “Croatian Spring” or “Maspok” (abbreviation from 
“masovni pokret”, or “mass movement”) in 1971 (pp. 309–313), where the 
already mentioned tendency to draw false equivalence between Serbs and 
Croats is observable once again, and in the section concerned with lan-
guage, Muslims are also included. Calic apparently believes that Serbian 
and Croatian and Muslim debates and disagreements reflected “the desire 
of national politics for greater independence” (p. 308), which makes her lose 
sight of the aggressive nature of Croat and Muslim national and linguistic 
policies and the defensive nature of the Serbian position, especially as far 
as the Maspok was concerned. She suggests that M. Nikezić and L. Perović 
wanted the same as the Croat political, economic and intellectual elites. The 
latter, however, contrary to the pro-Yugoslav policy of the Serbian com-
munists, demanded their “own army and foreign policy, even the revision of 
borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina” (pp. 310–311). Also, Calic makes no 
mention of mass outbursts of hatred poured out on Serbs in Croatia dur-
ing the demonstrations and other rallies in the Maspok period, including 
frightening slogans such as: “Comrade Tito […] go and put on Ustasha 
uniform!”57 Calic ends the section with a brief overview of the removal of 
leaderships in all republics from office, which also misleads the reader into 
57 On the nationalist mass movement, Maspok, in Croatia led by the League of Com-
munists of Croatia see I. Perić, Ideja Masovnog pokreta u Hrvatskog (Zagreb: Narodno 
sveučilište grada Zagreba, 1974); additional documents in Geneza Maspoka u Hrvatskoj, 
eds. J. Keser, Dj. Bilbija and N. Stefanović (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990). 
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concluding that there were equal shares of nationalism everywhere, which 
was not the case.58
Contradictory is the claim that Tito decided to step up centralism and 
curtail the freedom of the media and that his “system punished critics and 
nationalists, but then made their demands its own” (p. 317). The amendments 
to the Constitution in 1968–1972 did not centralise but further decentralised 
the country, whereby Tito essentially met the demands of the nationalists of 
all peoples save the Serbs who, being dispersed across Yugoslavia, were inter-
ested in as unitary and as centralised a state as possible. Slightly impressed 
by Tito’s hedonist and luxury lifestyle, she claims that critics could object to 
it but that “open opposition was inadvisable because of his great popularity 
[sic]” (p. 322). She says herself that in the mid-1970s there were “4,000 po-
litical prisoners” in Yugoslavia, third “only to the Soviet Union and Albania” 
relative to the total population (p. 317). 
The Constitution of 1974 indeed transformed Yugoslavia into a 
“federation with some elements of a confederation”. The author says quite 
precisely and accurately that the “decentralisation preached by Kardelj had 
little to do with democratisation because powers were simply transferred 
from the federal level to the republics without putting in place viable con-
trol mechanisms” and that the Constitution “made the federal state into 
an object of a complicated negotiation process among the republics where 
virtually all issues were imbued with a national charge” (pp. 319–320). The 
authors of the 1974 Constitution had no intention of creating such mecha-
nisms; the purpose of the constitutional change was to cater to Slovenia 
and Croatia, the Croat Maspok in the first place. Serbia, on the other hand, 
was given a subordinate position not only in relation to the other republics 
but also to its two autonomous provinces. This highly unfavourable posi-
tion is relativised by the author’s claim that Albanians were also dissatisfied 
because the province was not granted the status of a republic (p. 320) even 
though she is aware (p. 226) that Albanians were not a constitutive people 
even by the 1974 constitution but a national minority and consequently did 
not have the right to secession.59 It is unclear why Calic claims that Al-
banians orchestrated violent demonstrations in all larger towns of Kosovo 
in 1981 because they believed “the time had finally come” to realise their 
“desire for full equality” (pp. 335–336) if then, as well as back in 1968, the 
main demand was the status of a republic as a transition to Kosovo’s uni-
fication with Albania (p. 336). She also gives the figure of “about 131,000” 
Serbs and Montenegrins that left the province between the Second World 
War and 1981 but, without going deeper into the reasons for the exodus, 
58 M. Djurić, iskustvo razlike: suočavanja s vremenom (Belgrade: Tersit, 1994).
59 R. Rajović, Autonomija Kosova. Pravno-politička studija (Belgrade: Ekonomika, 1987).
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is content to say that a “real migration boom” after 1981 was taking place 
in a “save-your-skin-if-you-can atmosphere” (p. 337). What lay behind it 
was the systematic intimidation of Kosovo Serbs; the albanisation of police, 
judicial and party structures, with the tacit approval of the federal and pro-
vincial authorities, left them without any legal protection and they moved 
en masse to central Serbia.
Calic is of the opinion that, in addition to other reasons, economic, 
political, ideological, international, the system lost legitimacy because “the 
communist policy of memory whose goal was to remove the civil war and 
nationalist persecutions from collective memory failed” (p. 358). Family 
memories obviously escaped the decreed version of the past built through 
Tito’s personal cult, the myth of the heroic Partisan struggle and “brother-
hood and unity”.
Apart from the role of Germany in the Yugoslav crisis, Calic’s ac-
count practically comes down to retelling the politically correct narrative of 
The Hague Tribunal which places the blame for the disintegration of Yugo-
slavia and the wars almost solely on the Serbs, including almost unavoidable 
quotations from court proceedings. Had she consulted, say, the memoirs of 
Josip Boljkovac, Tudjman’s first interior minister, she would have found the 
claim that Croatia attacked the Yugoslav Army and started the civil war and 
not the other way round.60 
In the section devoted to ethnic cleansings, war crimes and destruc-
tion of cultural heritage, Calic describes at length and to the last detail 
the crimes committed by Serbs against Muslims, while Muslim and Croat 
crimes against Serbs are either not mentioned at all or are mentioned in 
passing and evasively, for instance, that “from 1993 Muslim and Bosniak 
forces also began to homogenise their areas” (p. 391). She does not take 
the trouble to mention that those forces also had camps where Serbs were 
imprisoned and tortured.61 As far as Croat crimes are concerned, in the sec-
tion devoted to the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict in the second 
half of 1992 Calic says that “ethnically mixed regions were meant to be 
60 J. Boljkovac, “Istina mora izaći van...”: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova 
neovisne Hrvatske (Zagreb: Golden marketing & Tehnička knjiga, 2009).
61 For more detail see the collections of documents Muslimanski logor Visoko. Dnevnik i 
kazivanje logoraša, ed. M. Mitrović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1994); Stradanje 
Srba u Konjicu i Tarčinu, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 
1995); Stradanje Srba u Sarajevu. Knjiga dokumenata, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Kome-
sarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995); Stradanje Srba u Mostaru i dolini Neretve. Knjiga 
dokumenata, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995); bilingual 
Serbian and English editions: Zatvori i logori u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini (kazi-
vanja logoraša), ed. M. Mitrović (Belgrade: Vojska, 1997); S. Pašalić, Stradanja Srba i 
srpskih naselja u bivšoj Bosni i Hercegovini (Banjaluka: Banjaluka Company, 1997).  
Balcanica XLVI (2015)378
homogenised and proclaimed purely Croat” and singles out as the symbol 
of “devastation” the “destruction of Mostar, a former tourist attraction, and 
its historic 16th-century bridge by the Croat Defence Council [HVO]” (p. 
389). The author does not find it relevant to mention the first war crime in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the village of Sijekovac on 26 and 27 March 
1992, committed against local villagers by Croatian regular and HVO 
troops teamed up with paramilitary forces of Bosnian Muslims, nor any 
collective crime by Muslims against Serbs except the “bloodshed” commit-
ted by forces under the command of Naser Orić in the villages of Glogova 
and Kravica in 1993 (p. 400).
In her account of the 1995 operations of the Croatian army “Oluja” 
(Storm) and “Bljesak” (Flash), Calic mentions “150,000 to 200,000” ex-
pelled Serbs (p. 402) but fails to mention about 2,000 civilian victims of the 
operations, including women and children, and several thousand people still 
accounted as missing. The description of the situation in Kosovo in 1999 
lacks the information about the number of Serbs, Montenegrins and other 
non-Albanians who fled the province after the arrival of UN peacekeeping 
troops: 246,000, of whom nearly 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins as well 
as a large number of Goranci (Muslim Slavs) and Roma. After 1999 from 
UN-administered Kosovo migrated 60% of the Kosovo Serbs, 66% of the 
Goranci and as much as 70% of the Roma, and most never returned to their 
homes. Not a word about dozens of ethnically cleansed towns, more than 
150 demolished and heavily damaged Serbian monasteries and churches, 
the necessity to place the most important Serbian monasteries under mili-
tary protection, forcible takeovers of Serb-owned houses, flats and land by 
Albanians.62
The author sheds light on the role of unified Germany in fuelling 
the Yugoslav crisis at its beginning in 1991 (pp. 385–386). Namely, eager to 
assert its political strength on the post-Cold War international scene, Ger-
many’s initial political support followed by rash recognition of Slovenia’s 
and Croatia’s independence precluded a feasible solution for the status of 
the Serb community in Croatia and for reorganisation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. On the contrary, this recognition gave a clear signal to Bosnian 
Muslims (and Bosnian Croats) to break away from Yugoslavia too, even 
at the cost of civil war. Calic, however, does not mention that Germany’s 
signature of the Treaty of Maastricht was conditional upon recognition of 
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence.63  
62 Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the Enclave, ed. D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: Institute for 
Balkan Studies, SASA, 2007).
63 Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije, eds. R. Nakarada, L. Basta and Sl. 
Samardžić (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1991); A. Pavković, The Fragmenta-
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For all her undeniable effort Calic has not managed to produce a 
book that lives up to her own professed standards: “without prejudice but 
not without passion” (p. 17). As if her sympathy for the Titoist era and its 
official version of history came with prejudices, old and new. Considering 
her familiarity with the language, culture and literature of the western Bal-
kans, the reader had every right to expect much, much more than a fairly 
one-sided portrayal of the recent and contemporary past of the Yugoslav 
space. 
Bibliography 
Avakumović, I. Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima. London: Naša reč, 1969.
Bajt, Al. Bermanov dosije. Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2006.
Bataković, D. T. Nova istorija srpskog naroda. Belgrade: Naš dom, 2000.
— Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies. Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1994. 
Beloff, N. Tito’s Flawed Legacy. Yugoslavia and the West since 1945. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1985.
Bjelajac, M. Vojska Kraljevine SHS 1918–1921. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988.
Boljkovac, J. “Istina mora izaći van...”: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova 
neovisne Hrvatske. Zagreb: Golden marketing & Tehnička knjiga, 2009.
Borozan, Dj. Velika Albanija. Porijeklo, ideje, praksa. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut 
VJ, 1995.
Božić, S. “Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): between the myth of ‘greater Serbian hege-
mony’ and social reality”. Balcanica LXI (2010), 185–208.
Božić, S. Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008.
Čavoški, K. Tito: tehnologija vlasti. Belgrade: Dosije, 1990.
Christitch, K. Les faux-frères. Mirages et réalités yougoslaves. Paris: Flammarion, 1996.
Ćorović, V. Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svetskog rata 1914–
1918. Sarajevo: B. Djurdjević, 1910.
Cvetković, S. Izmedju srpa i čekića. Politička represija u Srbiji 1944–1953. Belgrade: Ins-
titut za savremenu istoriju, 2006.
Dimić, Lj. Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941, 3 vols. Belgrade: Stu-
bovi kulture, 1996.
Dimitrijević, B. and K. Nikolić. Djeneral Mihailović. Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2000.
Djordjević, D. “Die Serben”. In Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, vol. III, 734–774. 
Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1980.
— Ožiljci i opomene, 2 vols. Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994–95.
tion of Yugoslavia. Nationalism and the War in the Balkans (Houndmills: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2000); R. Nakarada, Raspad Jugoslavije. Problemi tumačenja, suočavanja i tran-
zicije (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008).
Balcanica XLVI (2015)380
Djordjević, Z. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu. Belgrade: 
ABC-Grafika, 1977.
Djukić, S. Kako se dogodio vodja. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1991. 
Djurić, M. Iskustvo razlike: suočavanja s vremenom. Belgrade: Tersit, 1994.
Documents diplomatiques concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans 
la Vielle-Serbie (vilayet of Kosovo) 1898–1899. Belgrade: Ministère des Affaires 
étrangères, 1899.
Ekmečić, M. Dugo kretanje izmedju klanja i ranja. Istorija Srba u novom veku (1492–
1992). Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007.
Gavrilović, V. Temišvarski sabor i Ilirska dvorska kancelarija (1790–1792). Novi Sad: Pla-
toneum, 2005.
Geneza Maspoka u Hrvatskoj, eds. J. Keser, Dj. Bilbija and N. Stefanović. Belgrade: 
Književne novine, 1990. 
Hayden, R. M. Blueprints for a House Divided. The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav 
Conflicts. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985.
Jagodić, M. Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912). Belgrade: Zavod 
za udžbednike, 2009
Jovanović, J. M. Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja. Belgrade: Geca Kon, 
1941.
Kazimirović, V. Nemački general u Zagrebu. Kragujevac: Prizma & Belgrade: Centar film, 
1966.
Klaić, N. “O jednoj ‘naučnoj diskusiji’”. Historijski zbornik 14 (Zagreb 1961), 259–267.
Kljakić S. and M. F. Kranjc. Slovenački četnici: poverljivi izveštaji vojvode i komandanta 
Karla I. Novaka. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2006.
Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the Enclave, ed. D. T. Bataković. Belgrade: Institute for 
Balkan Studies, SASA, 2007.
Krestić, V. Biskup Štrosmajer u svetlu novih izvora. Novi Sad: Prometej, 2002.
— Biskup Štrosmajer: Hrvat, velikohrvat ili Jugosloven. Jagodina: Gambit, 2006.
— Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1848–1914. Belgrade: Politika & SANU, 1991.
Lazitch, B. Tito et la révolution yougoslave. Paris: Fasquelle, 1957.
Lees, M. I. The Rape of Serbia. The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power 1943–1944. San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990.
Leković, M. Martovski pregovori 1943. godine. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985.
Ljušić, R. Srpska državnost 19. veka. Belgrade: SKZ, 2008.
Martin, D. The Web of Disinformation. Churchill ’s Yugoslav Blunder. San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1990. 
Miletić, A. Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 2 vols. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986–87.
Miljuš, B. Revolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945. Lausanne: Srpski institut u Lozani & 
Belgrade: BIGZ, 1991.
Mitrović, A. Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu. Belgrade: SKZ, 1984.
M. Mišić, On a One-sided Interpretation of the Yugoslav Past 381
Muslimanski logor Visoko. Dnevnik i kazivanje logoraša, ed. M. Mitrović. Belgrade: Voj-
noistorijski institut, 1994.
Nakarada, R. Raspad Jugoslavije. Problemi tumačenja, suočavanja i tranzicije. Belgrade: 
Službeni glasnik, 2008.
Nikolić, K. Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 1941–1945, 3 vols. Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999.
Novak, V. Magnum Crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb: Nakladni za-
vod Hrvatske, 1948.
Paris, E. Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941–1945. A Record of Racial and Religious Perse-
cutions. Chicago: Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1962.
Pašalić, S. Stradanja Srba i srpskih naselja u bivšoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Banjaluka: Banja-
luka Company, 1997.  
Pavković, A. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Nationalism and the War in the Balkans. 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
Pavlović, V. Od monarhije do republike. SAD i Jugoslavija 1941–1945. Belgrade: Clio, 
1998.
Pejanović, Dj. Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine. Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1955.
Perić, I. Ideja Masovnog pokreta u Hrvatskog. Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište grada Za-
greba, 1974. 
Pešić, D. Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje 1919–1935. Belgrade: Rad, 1983.
Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890–1900, ed. B. Peruničić. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 
1985. 
Popov, J. Drama na vojvodjanskom selu (1945–1952). Obavezni otkup poljoprivrednih 
proizvoda. Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2002. 
Popović, N. B., ed. Kosovo i Metohija u velikoalbanskim planovima 1878–2000. Belgrade: 
Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2001.
Prilozi istraživanju zločina genocida i ratnih zločina, ed. J. Mirković. Belgrade: Muzej 
žrtava genocida, 2009.
Rajović, R. Autonomija Kosova. Pravno-politička studija. Belgrade: Ekonomika, 1987.
Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije, eds. R. Nakarada, L. Basta and Sl. 
Samardžić. Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1991.
Rivelli, M. A. L’Arcivescovio del genocidio. Milan: Kaos Edizioni, 1999.
Rivelli, M. A. Un génocide occulté. Etat indépendant de Croatie 1941–1945. Lausanne: 
L’Age d’Homme, 1999. 
Roberts, W. R. Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies 1941–1945. New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1973. 
Simić, P., Tito, tajna veka. Belgrade: Novosti, 2009.
Skoko, S. Krvavo kolo hercegovačko 1941–1942, 2 vols. Pale: SKPD Prosvjeta & Belgrade: 
Planeta, 1999–2000.
Skoko, S. Pokolji hercegovačkih Srba ’41. Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1991.
Slijepčević, Dj. Makedonsko crkveno pitanje. Munich: Iskra, 1969.
Steinberg, J. All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–1945. London and New 
York: Routledge, 1990.
Balcanica XLVI (2015)382
Stradanje Srba u Konjicu i Tarčinu, ed. D. Bojić. Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. 
Srbije, 1995.
Stradanje Srba u Mostaru i dolini Neretve. Knjiga dokumenata, ed. D. Bojić. Belgrade: 
Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995.
Stradanje Srba u Sarajevu. Knjiga dokumenata, ed. D. Bojić. Belgrade: Komesarijat za 
izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995.
Stranjaković, D. Najveći zločini sadašnjice. Patnje i stradanja srpskog naroda u Nezavisnoj 
Državi Hrvatskoj od 1941. do 1945. Gornji Milanovac: Dečije novine, 1991.
Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901–1913, ed. B. Peruničić. Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1988. 
Taylor, A. J. P. The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and 
Austria-Hungary. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948.
Thomas, D. G. C., ed. Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Interven-
tion. Lexington Books, 2003. 
Tomac, P. Prvi svetski rat 1914–1918. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1973.
Tošić, D. Kolektivizacija u Jugoslaviji 1949–1952. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2002.
Troude, G. Conflits identitaires dans la Yougoslavie de Tito 1960–1980. Paris: Editions de 
l’Association Pierre Belon, 2007.
Vučković, Z. Sećanja iz rata. Od otpora do gradjanskog rata, 2. vols. Belgrade: Čiča, 1990.
Woodward, S. L. Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington 
DC: Brookings, 1995. 
Zadužbine Kosova: Spomenici i znamenja srpskog naroda, ed. A. Jevtić. Prizren: Eparhija 
raško-prizrenska & Belgrade: Bogoslovski fakultet, 1987.
Zatezalo, Dj. Jadovno, kompleks ustaških logora 1941, 2 vols. Belgrade: Muzej žrtava 
genocida, 2007. 
Zatvori i logori u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini (kazivanja logoraša), ed. M. Mitrović. 
Belgrade: Vojska, 1997.
Živojinović, D. R. and D. Lučić. Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo. Prilozi za Magnum Crimen. 
Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988.
Živojinović, D. R. Vatikan, Katolička crkva i jugoslovenska vlast 1941–1958. Belgrade: 
Prosveta Tersit, 1994.
— Vatikan, Srbija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države. Belgrade: Nolit, 1980.
Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu 1878–1912, ed. B. Peruničić. Belgrade: Nova, 
1989.
Žutić N, Dimić Lj. Rimokatolički klerikalizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Prilo-
zi za istoriju. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački novinski centar, 1992.
This paper results from the project of the Institute for Balkan Studies History of political 
ideas and institutions in the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries (no. 177011) funded 
by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic 
of Serbia.
